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preferable because it allows for a system of centralized decision-making, 
which is the most cost-effective and efficient means of governing corporate 
affairs.5  
This Article does not focus on the appropriateness of increased 
shareholder power per se, but instead analyzes the likely impact of that 
increase on corporate “stakeholders”—employees, customers, creditors, 
suppliers and other groups impacted by the corporation.6 In fact, one 
objection to increasing shareholder power is that such an increase would 
force directors and officers to focus solely on profits to the detriment of 
stakeholders.7 Bebchuk contends that this stakeholder-centered argument is 
very important because it has the potential to boost significantly the 
legitimacy of the case against shareholder power.8 This is because such an 
argument shifts the debate from a power struggle between shareholders and 
managers to a power struggle between shareholders and all other corporate 
constituents, thereby bolstering the appeal and seeming legitimacy of 
management’s position.9 Bebchuk has responded to the stakeholder-based 
argument by insisting that managers’ interests are not aligned with those of 
stakeholders, and thus insulating managers from increased shareholder power 
would enable them to advance their own self-serving goals at the expense of 
shareholders and stakeholders alike.10 This Article approaches this concern 
more affirmatively, and seeks to ascertain not only whether shareholders’ 
interests align with stakeholders, but also whether we should expect 
shareholders to use their increased power in a manner that benefits 
stakeholders.  
To this end, this Article rejects the presumption that expanding 
shareholder power will have a negative impact on stakeholders, and instead 
argues that at least some shareholders will use their increased power to 
advance stakeholders’ concerns. Such an argument recognizes that 
shareholders have divergent concerns and some of those concerns parallel the 
 
5 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1746 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 
624 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Shareholder Voting Rights]. 
6 This Article appreciates that not all stakeholders have similar interests. Hence, this 
Article argues that shareholder power may benefit some stakeholders more than others. 
See infra Part II.D. I would like to thank Stephen Bainbridge for highlighting the 
importance of this distinction to my argument. 
7 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 304–05 (1999). 
8 Bebchuk, supra note 4, at 912. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 909–11. 



















































